Three Effects/Results of the NASA Challenger Disaster

Three Effects/Results of the NASA Challenger Disaster

The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster occurred on January 28, 1986, when the space shuttle challenger (OV-099) broke down 73 seconds after it was launched, leading to the death of all the crew members on board. Among the crew members who lost their lives were five NASA astronauts, a school teacher, and a payload specialist. The tragedy left the world shocked since it was the first incident involving a spacecraft in the United States. Before Challenger launched on its ill-fated mission, the space shuttle had previously finished another twenty-four missions in a row since April 1981. Reports showed that the disaster resulted from the failure of the O-ring seal on the shuttle’s right-hand solid rocket booster. In addition, scholars established that it was due to extreme cold temperatures that the O-ring hardened part became less resilient, and this made hot gas escape and tear the space shuttle’s fuel tank.

In the aftermath of the accident, there was a lot of criticism on the side of NASA, where it was blamed for its luck openness. For instance, the New York Times was quick to note that the day after the fatal accident was experienced, neither the flight director for the ascent nor any other individual from the control room or the space agency was available to attend to the questions from the press (Cook). As a result, the press turned into using speculations whereby the New York Times and the United States International shared a similar storyline claiming that the accident was caused by a problem with the shuttle’s external tank, which was different from NASA’s internal investigation report which claimed that there was an issue with the solid rocket boosters (Eberhart 164). Additionally, the agency decided to stick to its strict policy of secrecy about investigation details which was an uncharacteristic stance for an agency that had long embraced openness.

The Rogers Commission was formed to investigate how the Challenger disaster occurred. Its members comprised Chairman William P. Rogers and Vice-Chairman Neil Armstrong. The commission committed to the investigations for several months before publishing a report of its findings. They found that failure in the O-rings sealing was to blame for the Challenger accident (Eberhart 164). They allowed hot pressurized gases and the flame to blow the O-ring where they made contact with the external tank leading to a structural failure.

Additionally, the team associated the failure of the O-rings with the faulty design since it made it easier for the spacecraft's performance to be easily compromised by various factors, such as ambient temperatures below 10 degrees Celsius. Also, the report considered other causes of the accident, such as failure on the side of NASA and Morton-Thiokol to adequately respond to the danger that the deficient joint design posed (Cook). Instead of NASA finding alternatives on ways to redesign the joint, they considered the issue as an acceptable flight risk. Moreover, it was found that the managers had been aware of the design problem since 1977. Still, they never discussed the flawed designs outside their reporting channels which was a flagrant violation of NASA regulations (Sanger A23). Even when it was more apparent how much of a problem that issue could be, no one was willing to push the idea of having to ground the shuttles until a fix was fully implemented. Also, the report critically criticized the decision-making process that resulted in the launching of the Challenger, terming it as flawed.

The United States House Committee on Science and Technology did a hearing, and on 29th October 1986, released their report regarding the Challenger’s accident. They paid more attention to the findings presented by Roger’s commission as part of the overall investigations, and they agreed with the results that technical causes caused the accident. However, they differed with the Roger’s Commission on their assessment of the reasons contributing to the accident. They argued that the cause of the accident was not poor communication as was earlier claimed; rather, the fundamental issue was poor technical decision-making challenges by top NASA personnel who failed to act decisively to ensure that the increasingly serious anomalies within the Solid Rocket Booster joints were solved.

After the Challenger accident, there was a suspension of further shuttle flights, pending the report of the investigations launched by different bodies such as the Roger’s Commission. Whereas NASA had had internal inquiries into the Apollo 1 fire, they found it hard to undertake any cause of action after the Challenger accident, which constrained all their activities due to judgment from outside bodies (Hiat 79). Additionally, nine recommendations were offered on ways to improve the safety of the space shuttle, where the Roger’s Commission directed NASA to ensure that it reported within 30 days how they were planning to implement the necessary changes as recommended (Sanger A23). In response to the recommendations offered by the commission, NASA initiated a total redesign of the shuttle’s rocket boosters. This process was overseen by an independent oversight group as instructed by the commission. Even though significant changes were made after the Challenger’s accident, many scientists have argued that all these changes were neither great nor long-lasting. 

Works cited

Cook, Richard C. Challenger Revealed : an Insider’s Account of How the Reagan Administration Caused the Greatest Tragedy of the Space Age. Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006.

Eberhart, J. “Challenger Disaster Muddles NASA’s Future.” Science News (Washington), vol. 129, no. 11, Science Service, 1986, pp. 164–164, https://doi.org/10.2307/3970368.

Hiatt, Laura. “Cook, Kevin. The Burning Blue: The Untold Story of Christa McAuliffe and NASA’s Challenger Disaster.” Library Journal, vol. 146, no. 5, Library Journals, LLC, 2021, p. 79–.

Sanger, David E. “Lessons From Uneven Challenger Investigation Help Create Attitude Change.” The New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast), The New York Times Company, 2003, p. A23–.